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Canadians have always observed American affairswithinterest,
enthusiasm, or alarm. While the sheer size of the American nation and
what we regard as the complexities of its institutional systems make it
difficult for us correctly to categorize all the developments in our
powerful neighbor, nevertheless the orientation of our interest is
predominantly southward. Our interest continues to be whetted by
news of what appear to be significant advances in your economic,
political, or social progress, even as it is piqued by your problems.
Anyone who undertakes a critique of a situation which has become
unstable through general dissatisfaction runs the risk of seeing the
problem he is examining solved between the preparation and delivery
of remarks, should the inertia of the political system be overcome and
action taken.It is entirely possible that this may happen in this
instance. General dissatisfaction with transportation policies in Canada
has grown to such an extent, beginning first with railway policy and
spreading rapidly to other transportation policies, that pressure has
grown on all sides upon the federal government. Policy action has been
promised during the present sitting of the federal Parliament.
The rising tide of interest in transportation policies evident on both
sides of our border is an indication of similar dissatisfaction with out-
moded policies. Yet it does not follow that comparable types of policies
have been in existence in the two countries throughout the past century.
Coincidently, rising dissatisfaction in the United States and Canada
with transportation policies does not mean that the policies are similar.
I take it as the main purpose ofpaper, not to draw a comparison
between the policies of the two nations but, more simply, to set out in
a broad framework the nature of the policies which have existed in
Canada and the extent to which they have failed to meet the demands
of the nation for a modern transportation system.440 RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: CANADA
Governmental acknowledgment of policy dissatisfaction takes a
course in Canada different from that in the United States. When a
problem becomes acute enough, the technique of the Royal Commission
is invoked. Following this technique, an attempt is made to set out
the problem and a group of commissioners is appointed to gather a
staff, hear evidence, and propose solutions. The parties that appear
before a Royal Commission present their briefs, and eventually their
argument, and the Commission then prepares a report of recom-
mendations for the consideration of the government. The government
accepts or rejects the recommendations as it sees fit, and the proposed
policy changes are introduced into the legislature where debate takes
place. In matters of transportation, this process has been undertaken
at least three times by federal Royal Commissions since the end of
World War II.In addition, there have been numerous special and
provincial inquiries into particular aspects of transportation problems.
Certain remedial legislation was offered following the reports of the
first two federal Royal Commissions, but the basic problems continued,
and general dissatisfaction grew. In order to present the nature of these
basic problems faced by the most recent Royal Commission, appointed
in 1959, some historical recapitulation is necessary.
Transportation in National Policy in Canada
In many aspects of the political life of a nation one could agree with
Edmund Burke that we read principles into history only after the event.
But the first sixty-year period of Canadian nationhood is a notable
exception. Before the Confederation, during its negotiations, and for
at least sixty years following the passage of the British North America
Act in 1867, policy on a broad scale, policy with principles easily
discernible, characterized the national growth. The measure of success
was not due entirely to the policy; good fortune and world affairs
contributed to economic growth. But without some such policy, the
economic growth would most likely not have occurred within the
framework of a Canadian nation. The contention that Canada is
economically and logically bound with the continental United States
would have been demonstrated before the end of the nineteenth
century, if the advent of the steam railway had not enabled an otherwise
inexorable economic pull to be resisted.
Canadian developmental policies have always embraced transpor-
tation policies. The transportation policies of the Dominion after 1867
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colonies, with emphasis more particularly upon railways than upon
other modes.
The colonial provincial governments of British North America
before Confederation had built certain main highways as public works.
Toll roads were little used and private turnpike companies were
unknown.
The Canadian and Imperial governments built nearly all the canals
of the St. Lawrence system as public works.Those, like the first
Welland Canal, which were built by private companies, received help
from government and were without exception taken over as public
works. The magnitude of these works and the lack of adequate private
capital made state action necessary and inevitable.Military needs
often reinforced the need for state action.
The same considerations applied in a varying degree to railway
construction, ownership, and operation. As in the United Kingdom,
public opinion and government policy at the beginning of the railway
age were divided as to whether railways should be built and operated
as public works or as private enterprises. In Canada, because of the
size of the country, the sparce population, the lack of private capital,
arid the imperative need of improved communications to develop the
country, the decision was rarely or wholly in favor of outright private
construction, ownership, and operation.Private enterprise seldom
proceeded without state aid in one form or another. Thus, after the
prolonged discussion between 1846 and 1862 on the construction of the
Intercolonial Railway to link the St. Lawrence region with the Atlantic
provinces, all assumed that the political and military considerations
governing the construction of the railway would see it progress as a
public work. The construction of the Grand Trunk Railway to parallel
the canal system of the St. Lawrence is an outstanding example of how
Canadian government, before Confederation, aided the construction
and operation of railways by private companies to a degree which
exceeded the help given railways in the United Kingdom and even the
United States. The company was given a bonus of £3,000 a mile, about
one-third the cost of construction, and government support was ex-
tended in other ways. When the Grand Trunk Railway encountered
early financial difficulties, guarantee of a new bond issue was made in
1855.In 1856, a further guarantee followed and an outright grant was
voted; further aid was given in 1857.1
A. W.Currie,TheGrand Trunk Railway of C'anada, Universityof Toronto
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The construction of the Grand Trunk was an act of provincial policy,
designed to give Montreal a share in the trade of the American Middle
West and a winter port in Maine by meeting the competition of
American railways and canals.
The Pacific railway was not less necessary, but it was an even more
complex and enormous undertaking. The acquisition of Rupert's Land
and union with British Columbia had to be first negotiated. Then the
incomparably longest railway of its time had to be built over some of
the most difficult terrain on the continent.Manitoba entered the
Confederation on the understanding that a railway would be built to
connect it with the outside world.Its public lands, purchased from
the Hudson's Bay Company in 1870, were to be "administered by the
government of Canada for the purposes of the Dominion." Of these
"purposes of the Dominion," two transcended all others—railways and
settlement. Those public lands were to provide the railways which
would link the scattered regions of the Dominion and were to encourage
the settlement, which would in turn support the railways and give
stimulus to the older regions. In 1929, sixty-two years after Confeder-
ation, it was officially declared these "purposes of the Dominion" had
been fulfilled, and the process of returning the remaining public lands
to the prairie provinces began.2 When British Columbia entered the
Dominion in 1871, the terms of union required the national government
to begin a railway to the Pacific within two years and to complete it
in ten—that is, by 1873 and 1883, respectively. Railway construction
was thus an integral part of national union and national expansion.
The decision to utilize railways to create and bind the nation carried
with it the decision to utilize all-Canadian routes. The railway policy
evolved before Confederation was designed to create a railway system,
paralleling the water system, to penetrate the heart of the American
hinterland.While there is no evidence that this pre-Confederation
policy was to be abandoned, it was definitely relegated to second place.
The Grand Trunk Railway finally gained access to Chicago in 1880.
Since that time, the St. Lawrence canals have been continuously
improved and deepened. But the construction of a transcontinental
railway system implied that the means of access from eastern Canada
to the prairies and the Pacific coast should be contained entirely within
Canadian borders. This decision meant that the costs of construction
were increased, and that a much larger participation by government
would be necessary.In the budget speech of Samuel Leonard Tilley
2ChesterMartin, "Dominion Lands Policy," CanadianFrontiers of Settlement,
Vol.II, Toronto, 1938, pp. 223—228.RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: CANADA 443
on April 1, 1873, some indication of the hopes for this new policy are
revealed. In justifying the proposal of ambitious expenditures of SlO
millionon the Intercolonial Railway, $30 million on the Pacific railway,
and $20 million on canals, he' referred to the great benefits which would
come to all parts of the Dominion as a result of these national in-
vestments. The construction of these great facilities was intended to
have a stimulating effect upon all the established centers in central
Canada and the Atlantic provinces, and the increase in trade was
intended to yield tax revenues to the Dominion.The Dominion
government confidently expected to recoup its investment in trans-
portation.
Certain other national policies inevitably followed from this decision
to capture and settle the western lands for Canada by the establishment
of all-Canadian transportation routes. For trade to move through the
channels constructed by massive public assistance, Canadian railroads
required some degree of monopoly, or imports and exports would be
free to move from the more settled portions of the United States across
the border into the Canadian frontier. So, the third national policy of
development, the promotion of industrialization by protective tariff,
was established in 1879. The tariff wall, in conjunction with railway
rates, was designed to assure effectively that trade would move east
and west to and from the more populous centers of central Canada,
and to Canadian river and sea ports. Thus it was intended that, by
heavy public investment, the Canadian nation would obtain a viable
economic place, and the necessarily great investment would be recovered
through the expanding volume of imports and exports of the growing
nation.
Public Concern with Railway Pricing
The task of railway construction was far more imperative in the first
generation of railway building than were the rates the railways might
charge when in operation. Furthermore, the economic philosophy of
the day led to the assumption that competition would protect the
interests both of the general public and of private persons. Obviously,
until additional railways could be built by other companies, such
competition was not present. Even after additional railway schemes
were promoted with varying degrees of public support, it became
obvious that competition between railways was not pervasive enough
to protect the shipper. Other modes of transport to insure equitable
treatment through intermodal competition were unavailable in many
sections of the country.444 RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: CANADA
When public complaints began in the 1870's, the Canadian govern-
ment, under the British North American Act of 1867, had full juris-
diction over interprovincial railways. The right of Parliament to limit
or regulate rates charged by railways was never in doubt;as the
creator and benefactor, certain presumptions of control were expected.
in addition, the current doctrine of public responsibility attaching to
common carriers gave residual and remedial powers to government.
Federal statute in 1879 gave power to the government to limit rates
when railway dividends exceeded 15 per cent of capital expended on
construction. In 1881, when the Parliament of Canada chartered the
Canadian Pacific Railway, that principle was extended to permit rate
control if dividends of 10 per cent on capital expended were exceeded.
The principle of public regulation, important as it was, could not
alone create a national policy of rate regulation. Because of the lack
of water competition in western Canada, rates were generally higher
there than in central Canada, and the imposition of the tariff policy after
1879 prevented the most settled portion of the prairies, the Province of
Manitoba, from enjoying the benefits of competition it might have had
from U.S. railroads. The tariff operated to diminish the flow of goods
northward from the United States and thus diminished the competitive
capacity of American railroads to haul exports from Manitoba. The
general effect was to maketheprairieprovincesanareainwhichCanadian
railways were sheltered from the competition of American railroads.
Until 1888, the Canadian Pacific Railway had an effective monopoly
of railway transportation in western Canada due to a guarantee in its
charter that no other railway would be permitted between its main
line and the American boundary. The withdrawal of this monopoly
clause in 1888 allowed the entry of the Northern Pacific Railway to
Manitoba, but its competition was restrained and forced only slight
reductions of rates.3
it was not until 1897 that national policy sought a means of modifying
the monopoly position of the railways in western Canada and of
reducing the disparity between rates charged in central and western
Canada. In that year, the first statutory limitation was placed upon
certain railway rates in an ad hoc attempt to control the prices of railway
services in an area where other modes of transportation were lacking.
The circumstances surrounding the introduction of that measure
need not concern us here in detail.It is sufficient to recall that the
federal government, in return for a cash subsidy and a land grant to
G. P. Glazebrook, A Historyof Transportation inCanada, NewHaven,1928, p.
309.RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: CANADA 445
enable the Canadian Pacific Railway to build a line through the Crows'
Nest Pass in southern British Columbia to the rich mining area in the
Kootenay Mountains, required the railway to reduce its rates on
specified commodities moving to Western Canada and on grain and
flour moving east for export. Those statutory rates were the first and
fundamental attempt to achieve a national policy of minimizing
differentials in freight rates in the interregional and export trade of
Canada. The rates on commodities moving to the west have long since
been released from statutory limitations, but the rates on grain and
grain products moving to export positions from western Canada have
remained the same since 1897, with the exception of a few years
following World War I.That exception was brought to an end with
the re-establishment of the statutory rates, about the same time that
the second national attempt was made to devise a transportation policy
to mitigate the disadvantages of great distances from the more outlying
sections of Canada to its center.
In 1927, as a result of agitation from the Maritime Provinces of
Canada and after examination by a Royal Commission, the Parliament
passed the Maritime Freight Rates Act. Since the economic welfare of
the Maritime regions did not depend upon any single staple product,
as the western prairies did, no attempt was made to fix statutory rates
on specific commodities. Rather, a new device was introduced. The
federal government undertook to pay 20 per cent of the railway freight
charges on commodities moving within the "select" territory, either
point to point, or from points to the western boundary of the territory.
The Act did not extend its benefits to goods imported from overseas
through Maritime ports or to goods moving into the select territory from
central Canada. In spite of the fact that the Maritime area has accessible
water transportation, the Act reduced only railway freight charges.
Since 1957, the rate reduction has been 30 per cent on the select-
territory portion of outbound rail shipments to other parts of Canada.
This further rate reduction has not been incorporated into the Maritime
Freight Rates Act, but has been authorized by annual vote of Parliament.
The third major component of national policy in transportation is
relatively new. It is highly significant, and indicative of the failure of
the older policies to adjust to a new situation, that the third policy was
not introduced until1951, long after the emergence of highway
transportation as a complicating factor in the provision of rail
transportation.
Following World War II, increasing complaints of regional in-
equities in railway freight rates caused the establishment of a Royal446 RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: CANADA
Commission in 1949. Faced with mounting costs of railway operation
and loss of much lucrative traffic to intercity highway operators, the
railways had sought and received permission to apply a number of
"horizontal" percentage increases to traffic considered able to bear
them. Basing its analysis and recommendation upon the well-estab-
lished principle of national responsibility for assuming part of the
costs ascribable to overcoming long distances in transportation, the
1951 Royal Commission made the following comment:
Various submissions were made to the commission as to steps which ought
to be taken to lessen the burden of freight rates for the western provinces
whose geographic location necessitates a haul of traffic inwards and outwards
over a long stretch of unproductive or only partly productive territory.4
The territory referred to was the long stretch of railway through
northern Ontario. The recommendation was that "the cost of main-
taining that portion of our transcontinental railway system which
serves as a link or bridge between east and west be charged upon the
general revenues of the country."Such a step was expected to "be
particularly effective as a measure of relief in the case of charges on
westbound traffic passing over this bridge." 6Therecommendation
was approved by the government and a bill to amend the Railway Act
was introduced in Parliament in 1951. This act, known as the Freight
Rates Reduction Act, but popularly as the "bridge" subsidy, provided
among other things for an annual payment of $7 million to the trans-
continental railways to cover the cost of maintaining the "bridge."
The act clearly set out the method by which the $7 million was to be
apportioned between the two transcontinental railways, but it did not
establish the method by which it should be applied toward reduction of
freight rates.It was left to the Board of Transport Commissioners for
Canada to work out the formula.
From time to time, there have been other special provisions from the
public treasury for assistance to the movement of certain classes of
commodities within Canada. But the principles implicit in the three
main pillars of transportation policy are the bases from which policy
issues today arise. Each of the three, Statutory Grain Rates, Maritimes
Freight Rates Act, and the Freight Rates Reduction Act, although
separated by over half a century, are logical only if a railway enjoys a
monopoly in overland transport and if, as a monopoly, needs restraint,
is able to recoup possible losses from other traffic, and can be used as a
Report of the Royal Co,mnission onTransportation,Ottawa, 1951, p. 253.
Ibid.
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vehicle to pass on public assistance to shippers. If any or all of these
conditions do not hold, then in one measure or another, the policies
misallocate resources, distort market demands for transport, or fail
to ensure benefit where it is intended.
The Search for Transport Policy
In the Canadian past, great national aspirations were reflected in
national policy, of which transportation policy was a part. At no time
was it discernible that careful economic criteria were the parameters of
transportation policy. Transportation, which meant primarily railway
transportation, was intended to serve the national interest and, in so
doing, was expected to be extensively endowed by the public purse in
capital construction and protected sufficiently to see the private investor
adequately rewarded. Imperfectly as it might appear in terms of an
economic analysis, the transportation function was well defined in
relation to national policy.
The forms of public investment in a multimode transportation
environment are so diverse, and the intermodal effects of it so im-
plicating, that transportation policy has shifted its focus and, in shifting,
has become blurred. Rather than designating the function of transport,
policy has been turned inward until it has become a series of expedients
for permitting each mode to live regardless of the effects upon the
adequate total provision of transport service. Each mode has its voice,
and each voice seeks to achieve a better competitive posture in the face
of other modes. Public policy recommendations in Canada, since 1949
at least, have been based on studies initiated by the breakdown of the
older identification of transportation with railways, and have been
aggravated by special interests. The definition of special interest in this
context ranges from proximate administrative necessity to resolve
special problems created by the failure of policy to keep abreast of
technology, through vested public and private interest in the regulatory
status quo.Between these limits are set the terms of reference for
specific research, which means that research begins with its broad
directions predetermined. These factors have been determining because
study at a more fundamental level to define a simple standard of
national interest in transportation is lacking. The continuing collection
of pertinent data is inadequate, and there is insufficient basic research
on the economically strategic aspects of industry, on regional structure,
economic behavior, organization, and interrelationships. These failures
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needs for transport services in the economy and, therefore, defenseless
against special interests. Unless and until a long-range and far-ranging
program of study receives legislative and public support, any attempts
to rationalize the transport functions must inevitably be limited in
scope, and be in the nature of palliatives to meet emergent shorter-run
crises.
The economic and political shape of Canada, the constitutional
forms, and the distinct development of national policy may super-
ficially obscure the relevance of American problems to the Canadian
situation. But the similarity is real. The smaller size of the economy
and the parliamentary system of government do help us to focus
attention on economic problems with which transportation is closely
associated.But, at least until recently, the legacy of past policy has
successfully kept Caliadians from isolating the symptoms from the
real causes. The transportation requirements of technological progress
in industry, growing regional diversification, and changing consumption
patterns have been met by adding to the total private and public
investment in transportation, without sufficient consideration of the
total transport needs, and without sufficient concern for the changed
environment in which regulation operates. As each new mode appeared,
ad hoc regulatory arrangements have been set up without regard for
the inevitable impacts upon other modes. In response to regional and
national demands, new investments of significant magnitudes have been
undertaken without regard to the need for a policy which defines the
roles of each mode, and without policy adjustments suited to changing
roles.
Constitutionally, in Canada, regulation of all modes of transport
are, or can be, concentrated at the federal level, either totally or for
interprovincial segments. In practice, all modes except highway trans-
port are federally controlled in varying degrees. This has not brought
the uniformity which might logically have been expected in a relatively
simple economy. So far as experience shows, there is no coordination
of regulation or of policy between numerous federal authorities
separately charged with transport responsibilities. Theoretically, such
coordination and responsibility for policy coalesce in the federal
Cabinet which, under the parliamentary system, is responsible to the
Legislature. The evidence is that the Canadian system has been no
more successful than the American has been in achieving unity of
outlook. Even after a generation of intermodal competition, the most
recent Royal Commission set up by the federal legislature was directed
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many regional complaints, solely within the framework of railway
operations. Fortunately the Commissioners interpreted their terms of
reference more broadly.
Canadian Royal Commission reports on transportation, like similar
investigations in the United States, have been accused of being pro-
railway. This is true of the most recent report. That it appears so is
purely an accident of history:the only form of overland transport
available at the time the Canadian nation set its course was the railway.
Consequently, transportation policy was almost entirely railway policy.
The close association of railways and politics throughout our history
still leads many Canadians to believe in the continuing political and
economic influence of railways. The sheer size of our two railway
systems gives some validity to this conviction, but it distorts public
objectivity. Canadians have not yet realized that the wealth, size, and
number of interests vested in other modes make them politically more
powerful, considerably more vocal and, in some cases, create interests
more vested in the status quo than those of the railways.
To the casual reader, or to one whose assumptions respecting the
relative and relevant role of each mode of transport in Canada are
biased by special interest or failure to allow for the rapid pace of
change, the report of the most recent Royal Commission on Trans-
portation is very little different from any other. Set up at a time when
transportation was the most vexatious of all domestic problems in
Canada, its purpose was interpreted by many as solely to find a
solution to rising freight rates without public subsidy, without sub-
stantial restriction on the freedom of competition, and without with-
drawing every Canadian's inherent right to regular and frequent rail
service.Now, two years after the substantive report, the national
anguish over transportation problems seems to have subsided. And,
as yet, no part of the recommendations has been implemented.
I am convinced that, in spite of the prejudicial circumstances which
surround research into policy, the Report of the Royal Commission on
Transportation succeeded in reaching down toward some under-
standing of basic transportation functions in a multimode environment.
Short-term solutions had to be found, and I believe they were found,
consistent with the longer-term assessments. The Commission recog-
nized the changed role of rail transport, and the redefinition inevitably
implied definition of some other roles.It recognized the fact of com-
petition and that public investment is the single largest determinant of
the degree of competition. The Commission recognized and attempted
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industry and suggested the nature and extent of regulation in keeping
with those differences.It divested itself of any suggestion that the
purpose of policy is to keep any segment of the industry alive, save for
clear and evident nontransport purposes, and further suggested that
the costs of those purposes are a national burden. Furthermore, it had
the humility to say that no single investigation could hope to solve
permanently the problems associated with a dynamic and unpredictable
industry serving a growing nation, and it proposed continued research.
It had the foresight to see the limitations to continued study without
adequate universal data, and without the relevant cost data collected
and collated in a mariner useful for increasingly sophisticated costing
processes. Finally, the Commission embarked timidly into the federal
constitutional problems associated with coordination in public policy,
but could only recognize the necessity of federal leadership.
In any nation, the allocation of resources in transportation cannot
be determined at less than the national level, although not necessarily
exclusively there.Coordination of public investment or, at the very
least, full knowledge of public investment plans in transport is absolutely
essential. The resolution of issues of public policy today must begin
with some attempt at their definition, some understanding of the
quantitative significance of the issues, some study of the effects of past
and projected policy enactments, some assessment of the impacts of
public investment. In the modern idiom these are all embraced in the
word "research."
Research regards its tasks as essentially nonnormative preparation
for policy decisions.Canadian experience in transportation policy
decisions does nothing to encourage such an attitude. The reverse is
often apparent: some special regional or interest groups are convinced
that policy decisions are justified on the grounds of special need, and
that the sum of "good" enactments must be the larger good. This
fallacy of composition and reliance on the doctrine of the invisible hand
applied to public policy is far from dead in Canadian transportation.
No one dealing with policy questions is naive enough to believe it
will ever really be otherwise. The great lack in Canada has been the
refusal of policy makers to see the need for larger examination of
transportation problems on a continuing basis. This failure is the more
regrettable, because there is no serious constitutional limitation to the
creation of an impartial and continuing research group removed from
the daily administrative decisions requiring study.Instead, there has
been a multiplication of administrative branches and boards, each
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excessive growth of departmental rigidity, to the detriment of the
cabinet system of government.With the growth of heavy federal
financial responsibility in the past twenty-five years, a perfect rationale
exists for creation of a research group to examine the needs, size, and
impact of public investment in transportati.on in the light of national
policies of growth and development.It would place in the hands of
policy makers an improved defense against importunate regional or
special demands, and provide at least one rational basis for positive
national policy decisions.
From a study of transportation investment—past, present, future—
almost every other aspect of the whole transportation problem would
open up. An explicit recognition that public investment is the single
largest determinant of the degree of competition within the whole
industry is invaluable in assessing the validity of competitive pleas
from various segments of the industry for public help or pleas to equate
somehow the flow of public bounty between modes.
Early in December, 1963, the first statement of legislative intention
was given to the present federal Parliament. The statement indicated
that this government, which is not the one which set up the most recent
federal investigation into transportation problems, is going to attempt
to find solutions without the establishment of a research group for
continuing investigation over all modes. The closest intention is to
exert considerable effort toward dismantling some of the railway plant
that is excessive by means which will cause the least economic dis-
turbance. This, like some other recommendations of the Royal Com-
mission, is useful, but it does not get down to the basic issue of the role
of each of the modes of transportation in the national policy of
development. Until that is at least begun, disputatious public policy
issues in transportation will continue to be met by intuitive response to
special pressures, inaccurate assessment of competitive realities, inept
and contradictory adhoc measureswhich will surely be fuel for future
burning issues.